



# TRADOC Running Estimate

Controlled Unclassified Information

The U.S. Army is closely studying Russia's war in Ukraine to revisit key assessments and derive lessons about Russia's strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities. This document represents a running estimate of TRADOC's assessment of Russia's performance in Ukraine, how it correlates to key assessments before the war, and potential implications for the U.S. Army across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). However, it is important to recognize that how Russia fights Ukraine will not necessarily reflect how it would fight the United States.

**KEY**

- Supported Assessment
- Inconclusive Assessment
- Contradicted Assessment
- ✓ Supported
- X Contradicted
- Inconclusive
- Change in Key TRADOC Assessment since last week.
- ★ See Classified Assessment

**Blue Text** reflects new Observation / Implication update since last week.

Big **M** refers to new **Materiel** development efforts that require use of the Defense Acquisition System; Small **m** refers to all items necessary to equip our forces that **DO NOT** require a new development effort (e.g., current "off the shelf" wpns sys, spares, etc.)

Key TRADOC Assessments of Russian Military	Observations of Russia's Performance Against Ukraine	DOTMLPF-P Implications for the U.S. Army
<b>KA-1:</b> The new objective [in Russian New Generation Warfare] is not victory in a conflict, but <b>regime change</b> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ RUS planning referenda in E UKR to integrate separatist "states" into RUS Federation on 14-15MAY22</li> <li>✓ RUS "Civil Military Authorities" force civilians to switch to approved cell &amp; internet service providers in Kherson and Mariupol</li> <li>✓ <b>RUS passports to be issued to Kherson residents after the "Civil Military Authority" requests RUS formally annex Kherson</b></li> </ul>	<p>D: Urban Warfare, Civil Affairs, Information Operations (IO); O: CA spt; T: OE replication; L: Mission Command; P: Screen Recruits/Soldiers; Policy: Frozen conflicts, Civilian support to operations, Dynamic Force Posture, Integrated Deterrence, Continuity of government, war crimes documentation &amp; evidence collection; Interagency Coordination</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input type="checkbox"/> m <input type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-2:</b> Russia is adept at <b>manufacturing a Crisis</b> that it can quickly resolve militarily short of the Conflict phase with the United States.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ <b>RUS alleges UKR intelligence backed attempted bombing in Kursk, RUS</b></li> <li>✓ <b>RUS requests UN Security Council investigates "U.S. Biolabs" in UKR</b></li> <li>✓ <b>RUS official claims NATO risks war with RUS over its support to UKR</b></li> </ul>	<p>D: MDO IO Deception/Resilience; O: MDTF (Info. Capabilities); T: Soldier/Family resilience; m/M: Disinformation detection; L: Resilience, Mission Cmd; F: Forward basing; Policy: IO authorities, US/NATO nuclear umbrella, ROE, <b>Proactive &amp; Integrated US/NATO Narrative</b></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> m <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> P <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-3:</b> [Russia] will use its <b>stand-off capabilities</b> with its extensive arsenal of long-range precision fires, massed indirect fires, and EW systems coupled with cyberattacks and information operations to contest, degrade, and deny any perceived incursion into its "near abroad."	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>RUS withdrew almost all surface ships w/ SS-N-27 SIZZLER ASCMs from Sevastopol to other Black Sea bases by 13MAY22</b></li> <li>✓ <b>RUS uses AS-24 KILLJOY hypersonic ASMs to attack multiple targets in Odesa</b></li> <li>X <b>RUS AF doctrine limits its use in UKR; focusing on ground forces support at the expense of strategic air campaign planning</b></li> </ul>	<p>D: Littoral Defense, Overwhelm defenses w/ <b>Joint</b> multi domain strikes, Army cross-domain sup, Air &amp; Missile Def at scale; O: Theater Fires Cmd, Organic &amp; mobile C-RAM, organic AD, Littoral defense; T: MDO, Sim. missile attacks/air strikes at scale, OPFOR TTPs, m/M: Air &amp; Missile Defense, Littoral defenses, Counter-fires/-measures, PGM war stocks, armor; Policy: Auton Wpns</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> m <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-4:</b> Whereas U.S. forces rely on artillery to support maneuver, the Russians take the opposite approach: <b>maneuver supports artillery</b> . Artillery is the decisive finishing arm for the Russian Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>X RUS continuing to piecemeal attacks in small units of action, without achieving mass at decisive points</li> <li>✓ RUS arty ops evolved from BNs firing from single position to separate, remote BTYs massing fires simultaneously on target</li> <li>X RUS arty fires not being followed up / exploited by maneuver forces</li> </ul>	<p>D: New FM 3-0, All-Domain Masking, Fire Support; O: Scale Units of Action (UA), Organic AD/C-RAM in line units, &gt;SP Arty; T: Contested maneuver, Counter-battery fires, Prepare for high volumes of indirect fire; Simulating effects of armed UAVs/LMs, Recognition and fire control links to SHORAD, OPFOR TTPs; m/M: &gt;SP Arty, APS, Counter-UAVs, mobile C-RAM; L: UA mass</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> m <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> F <input type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-5:</b> Russia accepts higher levels of <b>collateral damage</b> and states openly a willingness to escalate to achieve its ends.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ RUS destroyed all food warehouses in Sievierodonetsk; soldiers looting agricultural enterprises in the Kherson region</li> <li>✓ RUS allegedly destroyed 23K kms of roads, 32K m<sup>2</sup> of housing, 535x daycares, 866x schools, 231x med inst, &amp; 173x factories</li> <li>✓ <b>RUS shipping looted UKR grain to Latakia, Syria, in response to Syrian support for UKR "special operation"</b></li> </ul>	<p>D: LSCO proportionality, Protection, Homeland/DSCA Implications, Maneuver Support; O: Infrastructure repair; T: Exercises w/ ENGs clearing/repairing LOCs/gap crossings in contested environments, Noncombatant pacification; L: Law of War; P: Construction skills, Policy: ROE</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input type="checkbox"/> m <input type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-6:</b> [Russia] excels at the use of <b>cyber and information warfare</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ <b>RUS AcidRain/HermeticWiper cyberattacks on UKR mil comms &amp; govt computers supported initial offensive ops on 24FEB22</b></li> <li>✓ <b>RUS is attempting to influence Twitter users in Sri Lanka, Iran, and South Africa to its side with pro-RUS content</b></li> <li>X <b>RUS Smart TVs hacked during May 9<sup>th</sup> celebrations</b></li> </ul>	<p>D: MDO w/ constrained EMS, <b>C2/IO Resilience</b>; O: MDTF (Info Capabilities), Cyber Protection Teams; T: Soldier/Family IO Resilience, Ltd. EMS; m/M: EMS hardening; L: Cyber Resilience, Mission Command; Policy: Cyberattack Authorities, Integrate Joint Force Ops w/ Nat'l Narrative</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> m <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-7:</b> In spite of its modernization, Russia's military still has <b>demographic stresses</b> (1/3 of conscript pool are unfit for service), economic shortfalls, and a continued, but lessened, dependence on conscripted personnel.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ RUS MoD conscription boards directed to recruit at least 200 contract soldiers every week</li> <li>✓ <b>UKR Intelligence claims under-trained, ill-equipped RUS conscripts are being sent into combat despite Kremlin denials</b></li> <li>✓ <b>Some RUS mid-grade officers reportedly refusing to obey orders; soldiers wounding/killing themselves to avoid combat</b></li> </ul>	<p>D: LSCO Resilience, PsyOps, SoF Resistance Operating Concept; O/m: Scalable force struct, Force Reconst; T/P: Rapidly scale Recruit to Theater pipeline, <b>MOSQ, Soldier Resilience</b>; L: Resilience; F: Scalable Tng Base; Policy: Dynamic Force Posture, All Vol. Force</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> m <input type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-8:</b> Russia's <b>logistics system</b> is a weakness in their armed forces. The system is highly centralized and commanders are usually limited to receiving only their authorized supply allocations, including fuel and repair parts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ <b>Some RUS BTGs have been reconstituted for a second time</b></li> <li>✓ <b>Logistical deficiencies (e.g., lack of NVDs) and setbacks undermining RUS faith in senior leaders</b></li> <li>✓ <b>RUS using electronic components from washing machines to repair MBTs</b></li> </ul>	<p>D: LSCO repositioning, Logistics, High payoff targeting, Host/third nation contractors; O: Scale lift/transportation, MSR Security; T: Exercises est. forward fuel/ASP, LOC/MSL security, In difficult terrain &amp; weather / off road networks; Insider Threat; m: Up-arm/up-armor LOGPAC, <b>materiel supply chains</b>, operationalizing depot storage materiel, Transport/MHE; Policy: Vetting ctr spt</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> m <input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-9:</b> LSCO [large-scale combat operations] will be fought by Russian brigades, divisions and combined arms armies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ RUS 2 Guards CAA CP destroyed via UKR precision strike (LTD) and massed artillery barrage</li> <li>X RUS forces choosing between the ability to communicate vs maintaining OPSEC and surprise</li> <li>○ RUS established extensive C2 node under camouflage netting in Koloskovo, RUS, supporting their push into the Donbas</li> </ul>	<p>D: MDO, Joint Force Integration, set the battle; O: Divisions, Corps, and EAC; T: PACE/COMSEC, MCTP, CTCs, Live LSCO/Hybrid exercises; m/M: smaller, more mobile CPs w/ signature mgmt, Organic &amp; mobile C-RAM; L: Contingency Leadership, PME incorporate maneuver lessons learned; Hybrid Ops</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> m <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> F <input type="checkbox"/> P</p>
<b>KA-10:</b> Russian ground forces are fully <b>mounted and mobile</b> , as is the Russian Airborne.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ <b>RUS BMPT Terminators seen in UKR on 15MAY22; some developmental sys (2S23, BMP-2M, Uran-9) absent from conflict</b></li> <li>○ <b>RUS withdrew the only complete T-90M BN (RUS's most advanced MBT) from combat operations in Kharkiv</b></li> <li>X <b>Multiple RUS attempts to bridge &amp; project MR troops across Seversky Donets R. thwarted by UKR direct and indirect fires</b></li> </ul>	<p>D: Army sup. to Joint Operations; O: Joint Force mix of A/S/IBCTs, Mount/Dismount pax ratio; T: <b>Contested wet gap crossing, IPB</b>, Combined arms/dismounted ops, protect against precision &amp; massed fires; m: &gt; numbers of small, cheap, disposable, &amp; highly lethal sys; M: APS; L: CATS</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> O <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> m <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> F <input type="checkbox"/> P</p>

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