- Threats and Adversaries: One Centralized Location, For All Things Threat…
- Threats and Adversaries: RUS Unconstrained Use of Fires and Area Effects Munitions JUN-08-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: LSCO Includes Hybrid/Mixed Forces; Conventional, UW, Militias, Cyber & Proxies JUN-01-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: New, “Touted” Russian Systems Failing To Make an Appearance On the Battlefield MAY-25-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: RUS River Crossing Failures MAY-18-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Observation #9: Challenges Executing Operations In Urban and Other Complex Terrain APR-27-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: KA3-Russia Will Use Standoff… To Contest, Degrade, and Deny APR-20-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Use of Small, “Cheap”, Disposable, and Highly Lethal Systems APR-06-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Use of Small, “Cheap”, Disposable, and Highly Lethal Systems MAR-30-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Russian Military Operations Insights… MAR-23-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Russian Military Operations Insights… MAR-16-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Russian Military Operation Insights… The BTG In Conflict MAR-09-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Compeition & Crisis… Confilct In Real Time MAR-02-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Competition In Real Time FEB-23-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: Competition In Real Time FEB-16-2022
- Threats and Adversaries: “Competition” in Real Time FEB-09-2022
- Threats and Adversaries FEB-02-2022
- Russia and Ukraine Update JAN-12-2022
- Russia and Ukraine Update JAN-05-2022
- Russian Armed Forces Hybrid Warfare Doctrine DEC-01-2021
- Russian Use of Information Operations NOV-22-2021
- Russian Armed Forces Training Exercises NOV-17-2021
- Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) NOV-10-2021