This analysis examines the significant development of North Korea’s deployment of combat forces to Russia in support of the Ukraine conflict, beginning in late 2024. This marks a potentially dangerous new dimension of CRINK (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) military cooperation, offering valuable battlefield experience to North Korean forces while bolstering Russia’s manpower.

Key Findings:

• Unprecedented Deployment: North Korea is the first nation since World War I to deploy combat troops to fight on Russian soil, sending an estimated 11,000 KPA soldiers, alongside significant munitions supplies.
• Strategic Alignment: The deployment signals a deepening strategic partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow, framed by Kim Jong Un as a defense of Russian territorial integrity linked to North Korea’s own security.
• Battlefield Experience: North Korean troops gained valuable modern warfare experience, initially in logistics roles, then rotating to front-line positions in the Kursk region.
• Asymmetric Convergence: CRINK members demonstrate a convergence around shared strategic aims (challenging U.S. influence) while pursuing divergent operational goals.
• China’s Cautious Approach: While sharing strategic goals with Russia and North Korea, China maintains a cautious distance from formal multilateral military commitments, prioritizing bilateral partnerships.
• Iran’s Ambivalence: Iran’s stance is driven by potential economic competition with North Korea in the munitions market, despite deepening strategic ties with Russia.

Implications for the U.S. Army:

The evolving CRINK dynamic presents several critical implications for the U.S. Army:
• Precedent for Unconventional Deployments: North Korea’s deployment sets a precedent for potential unconventional force deployments by adversarial actors.
• Shared Objective: CRINK states demonstrate a shared interest in undermining U.S. influence globally, even without a formal alliance.
• Strengthening Defense Ties: The deepening defense ties between Russia and Iran, particularly regarding drone technology, signal potential for future collaboration.
• Exploitable Fractures: Variability in CRINK cooperation (China’s limited involvement, Iran’s neutrality) offers opportunities to exploit fissures within the axis.
• Evolving Threat Landscape: This development necessitates a re-evaluation of how the U.S. views and plans for future adversarial coordination, recognizing the potential for multitheater conflict.